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Summary
Background The novel inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus emerged recently in mainland China, whereas the inﬂ uenza A H5N1 
virus has infected people in China since 2003. Both infections are thought to be mainly zoonotic. We aimed to 
compare the epidemiological characteristics of the complete series of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of both viruses in 
mainland China so far. 
Methods An integrated database was constructed with information about demographic, epidemiological, and clinical 
variables of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of H7N9 (130 patients) and H5N1 (43 patients) that were reported to the 
Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention until May 24, 2013. We described disease occurrence by age, sex, 
and geography, and estimated key epidemiological variables. We used survival analysis techniques to estimate the 
following distributions: infection to onset, onset to admission, onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation, admission to death, 
and admission to discharge.
Findings The median age of the 130 individuals with conﬁ rmed infection with H7N9 was 62 years and of the 
43 with H5N1 was 26 years. In urban areas, 74% of cases of both viruses were in men, whereas in rural areas the 
proportions of the viruses in men were 62% for H7N9 and 33% for H5N1. 75% of patients infected with H7N9 and 
71% of those with H5N1 reported recent exposure to poultry. The mean incubation period of H7N9 was 3·1 days and 
of H5N1 was 3·3 days. On average, 21 contacts were traced for each case of H7N9 in urban areas and 18 in rural areas, 
compared with 90 and 63 for H5N1. The fatality risk on admission to hospital was 36% (95% CI 26–45) for H7N9 and 
70% (56–83%) for H5N1. 
Interpretation The sex ratios in urban compared with rural cases are consistent with exposure to poultry driving the 
risk of infection—a higher risk in men was only recorded in urban areas but not in rural areas, and the increased risk 
for men was of a similar magnitude for H7N9 and H5N1. However, the diﬀ erence in susceptibility to serious illness 
with the two diﬀ erent viruses remains unexplained, since most cases of H7N9 were in older adults whereas most 
cases of H5N1 were in younger people. A limitation of our study is that we compared laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of 
H7N9 and H5N1 infection, and some infections might not have been ascertained.
Funding Ministry of Science and Technology, China; Research Fund for the Control of Infectious Disease and University 
Grants Committee, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China; and the US National Institutes of Health. 
Introduction
Since Feb 19, 2013, when the ﬁ rst patient infected with the 
novel inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus from an avian source 
showed symptoms, 131 laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases have 
been reported in mainland China as of June 9, 2013. This 
virus seems to exhibit low pathogenicity in birds,1 by 
contrast with the severe disease that occurs in human 
beings.2 Such divergent interspecies presentation diﬀ ers 
from inﬂ uenza A H5N1, another inﬂ uenza virus of direct 
avian origin, which is highly pathogenic in both human 
beings and birds.3 Another immediately notable feature of 
H7N9 is the rapid accumulation of laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of infection in human beings, even though 
phylogenetic4 and epidemiological5,6 evidence suggests 
that transmission is mainly zoonotic. By contrast, 
H5N1, similarly an exclusive zoonosis with very few 
exceptions, has caused only 43 laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases 
of infection in human beings since the symptom onset 
date of Nov 25, 2003, in the ﬁ rst patient in mainland China. 
To improve our understanding of these diﬀ erent viral 
characteristics and to inform public health control 
measures for both co-circulating viruses, we aimed to 
compare key epidemiological variables of the complete 
series of laboratory-conﬁ rmed human cases of inﬂ u-
enza A H7N9 and H5N1 in mainland China so far.
Methods
Participants
In China, all laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of infection 
with H7N9 and of H5N1 are reported to the Chinese 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China 
CDC) through a national system for reporting of 
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notiﬁ able infectious diseases. Case deﬁ nitions, sur-
veillance for identiﬁ cation of H7N9 and H5N1 cases, 
and laboratory test assays are described in previous 
reports.6–9 A joint ﬁ eld investigation team comprising 
staﬀ  from local or provincial CDC, the China CDC, or 
both did ﬁ eld investigations of the laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of H7N9 infection. All patients with conﬁ rmed 
H5N1 infection were inter viewed by a trained team 
from the China CDC, except for two military cases. 
Demographic, epidemi ological, and basic clinical data 
for patients infected with H7N9 and H5N1 were 
collected on standardised forms. Investi gations were 
generally started within 24 h of diagnosis of suspected 
infection, clinical cir cum stances permitting.
China CDC constructed an integrated database, with 
detailed epidemiological information about each occur-
rence of laboratory-conﬁ rmed H7N9 and H5N1 reported 
to them by May 24, 2013. Information used in the present 
analysis included the age, sex, place of residence, number 
and type of contacts traced, symptoms at illness onset, 
and underlying medical disorders associated with an 
increased risk of inﬂ uenza complications;10 dates of 
illness onset, hospital admission, death or discharge; and 
dates of potential exposures to domestic or retail animals 
and visits to live poultry markets. 
The National Health and Family Planning Commission 
decided that the collection of data from cases of both 
H5N1 and H7N9 was part of an ongoing public health 
investigation of an emerging outbreak and thus was 
exempt from institutional review board assessment.
Statistical analysis
We plotted the geographical locations of cases of H5N1 
and H7N9, and did descriptive analyses of the dates of 
illness onset and the characteristics of the patients. 
We analysed the number and type of contacts traced for 
each patient by type of case and exposure history. 
Close contacts were deﬁ ned as people known to have been 
within 1 m of, or to have had direct contact with the 
respiratory secretions or faecal material of, a patient with 
laboratory-conﬁ rmed H7N9 or H5N1 infection any time 
from the day before the onset of illness to when the patient 
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of 130 and 43 laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of human infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 viruses in urban and 
rural areas of mainland China, with dates of illness onset between Nov 25, 2003, and May 3, 2013 
Provinces are shaded according to population density, and H7N9 and H5N1 cases. More recent calendar dates of illness onset are represented by symbols. 
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was isolated in the hospital or died.6,11 We used survival 
analysis techniques to estimate time-delay distributions, 
including the incubation period (infection to illness onset), 
illness onset to admission, illness onset to laboratory 
conﬁ rmation, hospital admission to death, and hospital 
admission to discharge.12,13 We com pared alternative 
parametric distributions, includ ing gamma, Weibull, and 
lognormal distributions, with non-parametric estimates, 
and selected the best parametric distribution on the basis 
of the Akaike information criterion.14 
Patients with conﬁ rmed infection and their relatives 
were interviewed to ascertain exposure histories to poultry 
and swine, and environmental exposures, during the 
14 days before illness onset.6,15,16 We estimated the 
incubation period on the basis of dates of reported close 
contact with live poultry as the proxy for infection, and in 
sensitivity analyses we explored estimates based on 
reported exposures to any live animals, and on reported 
visits to live poultry markets (thus accounting for the 
possibility of infection by environmental con tamination). 
Information about potential exposures was typically 
gathered for each of the preceding 14 days, but some cases 
had repeated exposures and our analysis explicitly allowed 
for the interval censoring in the exposure data.14 In this 
analysis, we did not include patients who reported recent 
live poultry exposure but could not recall the exact dates.
Although the case-fatality risk (ie, the risk of death 
among cases17) is commonly used as an important 
measure of the severity of infection, the estimated 
case-fatality risk can be highly dependent on the 
deﬁ nition of a case and might sometimes be mis-
interpreted. Instead, we chose to investigate the fatality 
risk of patients admitted to hospital, for two reasons. 
First, mild infections of both H7N9 and H5N1 are less 
likely to have been detected than serious cases and 
therefore the risk of death among medically attended and 
laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases would be diﬀ erent, potentially 
by several orders of magnitude, to the symptomatic 
case-fatality risk (ie, the risk of death in symptomatic 
cases of H7N9 and H5N1 virus infections). Second, mild 
cases identiﬁ ed through sentinel inﬂ uenza-like illness 
surveillance or contact tracing should have a substantially 
lower risk of mortality than serious cases admitted with 
pneumonia, and one estimated case-fatality risk would 
misrepresent this heterogeneity. We therefore estimated 
the fatality risk for patients admitted to hospital with use 
of a non-parametric approach that accounted for the 
competing risks of death or discharge, and right-
censoring of the outcomes of patients still in hospital.18 
We estimated 95% CIs for the fatality risk for patients 
admitted to hospital with bootstrap estimates of the 
asymptotic variance with 1000 replications.18,19 All statis-
tical analyses were done with R version 3.0.1.
Role of the funding source
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, writing of the report, or the 
decision to publish. BJC and HY had complete access to 
the data; the corresponding authors had ﬁ nal respon-
sibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
The present analyses included 130 cases of laboratory-
conﬁ rmed H7N9 infection in mainland China with 
illness onset dates between Feb 19, 2013 and May 3, 
2013. 43 cases of laboratory-conﬁ rmed H5N1 infection 
have been reported so far in mainland China, with the 
last case documented on Feb 9, 2013, with illness onset 
dates between Nov 25, 2003, and Feb 3, 2013. Although 
cases of H5N1 have been distributed across most 
regions of China, the occurrence of H7N9 in mainland 
China was initially concentrated in the Yangtze river 
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Figure 2: Occurrence of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of human infection with 
avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 viruses over calendar time
(A) Number of cases of H5N1 in urban and rural residents by calendar year of 
illness onset. (B) Number of cases of H5N1 in urban and rural residents by 
calendar month of illness onset. (C) Number of cases of H7N9 in urban and rural 
residents by date of illness onset.
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delta in eastern China, with the most recent cases 
detected away from the initial epicentre to the south 
and north (ﬁ gure 1).
93 cases (72%) of infection with H7N9 were in residents 
of urban areas. By contrast, the incidence rate of cases of 
infection with H5N1 peaked in 2006, and 24 cases (56%) 
were in rural residents (ﬁ gures 1 and 2A). 33 cases (77%) of 
infection with H5N1 occurred in the winter months 
(November–February; ﬁ gure 2B). Incidence of H7N9 
peaked in early April, 2013 (ﬁ gure 2C). A notable diﬀ er-
ence was recorded in the age and sex distributions of 
patients overall and by location of residence (ﬁ gure 3). In 
urban areas, the viruses were more common in men—the 
male-to-female ratio for H7N9 was 2·9:1 and for H5N1 
was 2·8:1. In rural areas, the male-to-female ratio was 1·6:1 
for H7N9 and 0·5:1 for H5N1. Whereas more than half 
(71 of 130, 55%) of the cases of infection with H7N9 were in 
people aged 60 years or older (median age 62 years), H5N1 
occurred mainly in young adults (ﬁ gure 3 and table 1). 
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Figure 3: Age and sex proﬁ les of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H5N1 and H7N9 viruses
(A) Age and sex proﬁ les for cases of H5N1. (B) Age and sex proﬁ les for cases of H7N9. (C) Age and sex proﬁ les for cases of H5N1 in residents of urban areas. (D) Age 
and sex proﬁ les for cases of H7N9 in residents of urban areas. (E) Age and sex proﬁ les for cases of H5N1 in residents of rural areas. (F) Age and sex proﬁ les for cases of 
H7N9 in residents of rural areas.
Inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
(n=130)
Inﬂ uenza A H5N1 
(n=43)
Median age, years 62 (47–73) 26 (19–35)
Number of men 92 (71%) 22 (51%)
Presence of at least one underlying medical disorder* 50/111 (45%) 5/41 (12%)
Urban residence 93 (72%) 19 (44%)
Rural residence 37 (28%) 24 (56%)
Possible source of infection
Any exposure to poultry 92/123 (75%) 29/41 (71%)
Occupational exposure to live poultry 6 (5%) 4 (9%)
Visited live poultry market 43/84 (51%) 23/41 (56%)
Exposure to sick or dead poultry 3/123 (2%) 16/41 (39%)
Exposure to backyard poultry 19/71 (27%) 21/41(51%)
Data are median (IQR), n (%), or n/N (%). *Only underlying medical disorders associated with a high risk for inﬂ uenza 
complications10 were counted here, including chronic respiratory disease, asthma, chronic cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes, chronic liver disease, chronic kidney disease, immunosuppressed status, and neuromuscular disorders. 
Table 1: Characteristics of laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of human infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
and H5N1 viruses in mainland China
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More than two-thirds of patients reported recent 
exposure to poultry for both H7N9 and H5N1 (table 1), 
most often through visits to a live poultry market (for 
H7N9) or exposure to sick or dead poultry or to backyard 
poultry (for H5N1). Symptoms at illness onset were 
similar between the two viruses, with fever and cough 
the most commonly reported symptoms, albeit less often 
for H5N1 (table 2). The mean number of contacts traced 
for each patient was much greater for H5N1 than for 
H7N9 (table 3). For patients infected with H7N9, 
2554 close contacts were reported, all of whom were 
traced—almost half were health-care-associated contacts. 
21 contacts developed acute fever or respiratory symp-
toms during the medical surveillance period of 7 days 
after last exposure, without appropriate personal pro-
tective equipment, to patients infected with H7N9. Close 
contacts who developed febrile respiratory illness were 
transferred to a designated hospital for diagnosis and 
treatment, and respiratory specimens, paired sera, or 
both, were collected for laboratory analysis. Four of the ill 
contacts were laboratory conﬁ rmed as cases of infection 
with H7N9. The mean number of contacts traced for 
patients infected with H7N9 was higher for urban (21·0) 
than for rural (18·3) residents (table 3).
Information about dates of recent exposures to live 
poultry was available for 32 patients (25%) infected 
with H7N9, and for 27 (63%) infected with H5N1. 
Weibull models had the best ﬁ t to the incubation period 
distributions for H7N9 and H5N1. We estimated the 
mean incubation period for H7N9 to be 3·1 days 
(95% CI 2·6–3·6, SD 1·4 days, 95th percentile 
5·5 days). For H5N1, we estimated the mean incubation 
period to be 3·3 days (95% CI 2·7–3·9, SD 1·5 days, 
95th percentile 6·0 days; ﬁ gure 4A). In sensitivity 
analyses, estimated incubation period distributions for 
H7N9 and H5N1 based on contact with any live animals 
or visits to live poultry markets were very similar (data 
not shown). 
The onset-to-admission interval was also similar for 
the two viruses (ﬁ gure 4B): for 123 patients infected 
with H7N9, the median interval was estimated to 
be 4·2 days (95% CI 3·7–4·9) based on the best-ﬁ tting 
gamma distribution, whereas for all 43 patients infected 
with H5N1 the median was estimated to be 4·9 days 
(3·9–5·9) based on the best-ﬁ tting Weibull distri bu tion. 
For the onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation delays, log-
normal models ﬁ tted best, and the distributions were 
similar for the two viruses (ﬁ gure 4C). For H7N9, the 
median onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation delay was 
8·3 days (95% CI 7·3–9·5), and for H5N1 the median 
was 10·7 days (9·1–12·7).
We estimated the fatality risks for patients admitted 
to hospital, excluding seven patients infected with 
H7N9 classiﬁ ed as mild and allowing for unresolved 
outcomes in 17 patients with H7N9 who are still in 
hospital.19 In 123 patients admitted to hospital with 
H7N9 and the 43 admitted with H5N1, we estimated 
respective fatality risks for patients admitted to hospital 
to be 36% (95% CI 26–45) and 70% (56–83), respectively. 
Almost all laboratory-conﬁ rmed infections with H5N1 
had resulted in recovery or death within 3–4 weeks of 
admission, but duration of hospital stay was typically 
longer for patients infected with H7N9 than for those 
infected with H5N1 (ﬁ gures 4D and 4E). The median 
time from hospital admission to death for patients 
infected with H7N9 was 12·0 days, compared with 
5·7 days for patients infected with H5N1 based on 
best-ﬁ tting lognormal distributions (ﬁ gure 4D). Of the 
patients who survived, the median time from hospital 
Inﬂ uenza A H7N9 
(n=85)
Inﬂ uenza A H5N1 
(n=37)
Fever ≥38°C 67 (79%) 24 (65%)
Cough 60 (71%) 20 (54%)
Sputum 28 (33%) 12 (32%)
Chills 17 (20%) 13 (35%)
Fatigue 18 (21%) 9 (24%)
Arthralgia 15 (18%) 12 (37%)
Shortness of breath 11 (13%) 3 (8%)
Sore throat 8 (9%) 2 (5%)
Coryza 3 (4%) 5 (14%)
Nasal congestion 3 (4%) 3 (8%)
Headache 3 (4%) 7 (19%)
Chest pain 2 (2%) 1 (3%)
Data are n (%).
Table 2: Comparison of symptoms at illness onset of laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of human infection with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 viruses 
in mainland China, based on available data
Inﬂ uenza A H7N9 (n=106) Inﬂ uenza A H5N1 (n=41)
n Mean health-
care contacts 
traced
Mean other 
contacts 
traced*
n Mean health-
care contacts 
traced
Mean other 
contacts 
traced*
Urban residence 71 11·2 9·8 17 69·9 19·9
Occupational exposure to 
live poultry
3 23·7 7·3 1 67·0 42·0
Exposure to retail live poultry 28 14·8 8·0 13 70·4 20·2
Exposure to live poultry 
elsewhere†
27 9·1 11·3 2 87·5 13·0
No known exposure 13 4·9 10·7 1 31·0 9·0
Rural residence 35 6·7 11·6 24 27·7 35·1
Occupational exposure to 
live poultry
3 9·1 6·9 3 5·7 19·0
Exposure to retail live poultry 11 12·8 12·9 8 34·0 31·4
Exposure to live poultry 
elsewhere†
20 3·3 1·7 13 28·8 41·1
No known exposure 1 0·0 10·0 0 ·· ··
Types of exposure were ordered by risk level and categorised to be mutually exclusive by exclusion of overlapping cases 
with raised risk of exposure. Imputation of missing data was done by assuming the same ratio between health-care 
contacts and other contacts in the same category.*Other contacts include family and community contacts. †Exposure 
to poultry elsewhere includes exposure to backyard poultry. 
Table 3: Average numbers of close contacts traced for laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of human infection 
with avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 in mainland China, based on available data
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admission to discharge was 41·7 days for those infected 
with H7N9, whereas it was 18·7 days for patients 
infected with H5N1 based on best-ﬁ tting Weibull 
distributions (ﬁ gure 4E).
Discussion
We present the comparative epidemiology of human 
inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 virus infections in China. 
Although both viruses are of avian origin, and neither 
has yet acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human 
transmission, diﬀ erences exist in their epidemiology.20 
Whereas most patients with conﬁ rmed H7N9 and H5N1 
infection reported exposure to live poultry (table 1), the 
type of exposure was very diﬀ erent in urban and rural 
locations. Figure 3 illustrates this ﬁ nding clearly, since 
the male-to-female ratio is much higher in urban than in 
rural areas for both viruses. This result is consistent with 
sex-based diﬀ erences in exposure, rather than diﬀ erences 
in immunity (panel). In particular, the male-to-female 
ratio is highest for cases in Shanghai compared with 
other urban areas (data not shown); anecdotally, Shanghai 
is the Chinese city where men, rather than women, tend 
to have the most frequent retail exposures to live poultry.26 
Our deduction has at least prima-facie validity in that the 
age distribution of urban patients infected with H7N9 is 
consistent with increasing exposure to retail poultry with 
advancing age.27,28 Whereas some of the cases of H5N1 in 
rural areas have occurred in regions with low population 
density and were associated with exposure to backyard 
live poultry or handling of slaughtered poultry,29 most of 
the rural cases of H7N9 were in people who live on the 
outskirts of urban areas and were exposed to retail 
poultry in live poultry markets; few such patients infected 
with H7N9 were exposed to backyard poultry (table 1). 
The preponderance of women among the rural cases of 
H5N1 might be due to greater exposures to rearing, 
slaughtering, and cooking of backyard poultry.7 The 
characteristics of patients infected with H5N1 in China 
were similar to patients infected with H5N1 in other 
countries in the region (table 4).
The estimated mean incubation period for H7N9 of 
about 3 days is much lower than that previously reported,6 
which prompted public health authorities to extend the 
period of medical surveillance for close contacts of 
conﬁ rmed cases from 1 week initially to 10 days now.31–33 Of 
note, the present ﬁ ndings concur with those estimated by 
an entirely diﬀ erent method based on inference from the 
time series of cases (Yu H, Cowling BJ, Wu JT, et al, 
unpublished). The clariﬁ cation of the incubation period 
distribution has important implications. Existing case 
deﬁ nitions should be updated, since incubation periods as 
long as 8–10 days are very unlikely. Quarantine or medical 
surveillance for close contacts need not last longer than 
1 week, since more than 95% of patients would present 
within 7 days of infection. Accurate estimates of the 
incubation period distribution can help estimation of 
epidemic potential in case an avian inﬂ uenza virus 
emerges that is eﬃ  ciently transmissible in humans.
Substantial interest has developed in the case-fatality 
risk associated with inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus infection. 
Because estimates of the laboratory-conﬁ rmed case-
fatality risk can be misinterpreted as estimates of the 
symptomatic case-fatality risk, although they diﬀ er sub-
stantially, we focused on the risk of death among patients 
admitted to hospital.19 We found this fatality risk to be 
about 36% for H7N9—which is much lower than that for 
H5N1. The fatality risk on hospital admission of 70% for 
H5N1 was similar to other reports from the region, 
except for Vietnam (table 4),21–24,28,30,34,35 and higher than 
estimates from Egypt, perhaps because of diﬀ er ences in 
the viral clade or variations in speed of hospital admis-
sions and levels of care.25,35
The longer average duration of hospital stay for patients 
with H7N9 before death (ﬁ gure 4) might represent 
advances in medical care that can sustain life for longer, 
but also suggests slower disease progression. However, we 
did not analyse detailed clinical information in this report, 
since a separate nationally based eﬀ ort is already underway. 
The present relatively long onset to admission intervals 
Figure 4: Comparisons of time-delay distributions for laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of human infection with 
avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 and H5N1 viruses
(A) Estimated incubation period distributions—ie, days from infection to illness onset. (B) Days from illness onset 
to hospital admission. (C) Days from illness onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation of inﬂ uenza A H7N9 or H5N1 virus 
infection. (D) Days from hospital admission to death. (E) Days from hospital admission to discharge.
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(median 4·2 days) and onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation 
intervals (median 8·3 days) for H7N9 (ﬁ gures 4B and 4C) 
could be reduced to permit more timely, and thus more 
eﬀ ective, treatment with antivirals.22,34 If preliminary 
testing can show inﬂ uenza A virus infection, either by 
rapid point-of-care tests or by RT-PCR, this could allow 
early antiviral treatment before the subtype is known. 
The authorities have traced more than 2554 close contacts 
of patients so far, with only four potential secondary 
infections detected, and those four speciﬁ c clusters could 
either be a result of low human-to-human transmission or 
a common source of infection.6 The high average number 
of contacts traced for each case (table 3), especially for 
patients infected with H5N1 who tended to be younger and 
therefore had more household and community contacts 
and care involving several hospitals and large medical 
teams, highlights the potential diﬃ  culty that would be 
faced in a future outbreak of an avian inﬂ uenza virus that is 
more transmissible between humans. The higher mean 
number of contacts for urban than for rural residents is 
indicative of the increased connectivity associated with 
urban living and the large medical teams found in tertiary 
referral hospitals in major cities.
Our analyses have several limitations. First, we have 
compared laboratory-conﬁ rmed cases of infection with 
H7N9 and H5N1, and some cases of infection might not 
have been ascertained, particularly those that occurred 
early in the epidemics, because, for example, of no access 
to laboratory testing in some areas. Almost all patients 
with laboratory-conﬁ rmed H7N9 infection had serious 
illness, including pneumonia, and all patients infected 
with H5N1 had pneumonia. Laboratory conﬁ rmation of a 
few patients infected with H7N9 with mild to moderate 
disease suggests a greater number of mild to moderate 
cases.8,19,28 Additionally, as of May 24, 2013, 17 patients 
with H7N9 are still in hospital, and the present H7N9 
outbreak might not have ended yet, which could lead to 
some bias in the follow-up data. Second, our estimates of 
the incubation period are based on a subset of 32 patients 
with information about single or repeated exposures, 
whereas accurate and complete information for expo-
sures can be diﬃ  cult to ascertain. The absence of 
exposure data for some patients could have caused bias 
in the estimates of the incubation period distribution.
Our estimates of biological variables, such as the 
incubation period and to some extent the fatality risk on 
admission to hospital, should be applicable to other 
countries. Other variables, such as the onset to hospital 
admission delay and the onset to laboratory conﬁ rmation 
delay, could also depend on health services and sur-
veillance capacity, whereas the age and sex distribution of 
cases would also depend on patterns in exposure that 
could diﬀ er in other locations.
In conclusion, we have reported estimates of important 
epidemiological variables and distributions of inﬂ u-
enza A H7N9. However, many important questions 
remain. The diﬀ erences in age distribution of patients 
with laboratory-conﬁ rmed infection with H7N9 and H5N1 
are intriguing; presumably, immunity associated with 
diﬀ erent histories of inﬂ uenza virus exposures has an 
important role in addition to diﬀ erences in exposure 
patterns. Although we have reported the fatality risk for 
patients admitted to hospital, the symptomatic case-fatality 
risk remains to be established and a large portion of the 
“clinical iceberg” of infection might have remained 
undetected so far. The warm season has now begun in 
China 
(n=43)
Vietnam22,30 
(n=67)
Thailand23 
(n=25)
Indonesia24 
(n=127)
Egypt25 
(n=63)
Calendar years of illness onset 2003–13 2004–06 2004–06 2005–08 2006–09
Median age, years (range) 26 (2–62) 25 (16–42) 18 (1–68) 20 (2–67) 10 (1–75)
Proportion of cases in men 51% 55% 64% 50% 36%
Presence of at least one 
underlying medical disorder
12% ·· 16% ·· ··
Any recent exposure to poultry 71% 64% 100% 82% 71%
Fatality risk for those admitted 
to hospital
70% 39% 68% 82% 39%
Median duration of hospital stay 
for fatal cases (days)
6 5 6 3 7
Median duration of hospital stay 
for non-fatal cases (days)
21 16 13 ·· ··
Table 4: Comparison of epidemiological characteristics of laboratory-conﬁ rmed inﬂ uenza A H5N1 cases 
reported in China and other countries
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched PubMed on May 27, 2013, with the terms “A(H7N9)” or “H7N9” or 
“A(H5N1)” or “H5N1”. We also searched articles available online at international medical 
and infectious disease journals. We did not ﬁ nd any reports of human infections with 
avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus before 2013. A total of 628 laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus infections in human beings have been reported to WHO by 
April 28, 2013,21 including 45 from China since 2003 (43 from mainland China and two 
from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). Most cases of H5N1 infection occurred 
in children and young adults reporting recent exposure to live poultry (table 4).22–25 
Preliminary reports of H7N9 epidemiology included three hypotheses for the increased 
incidence rate of laboratory-conﬁ rmed H7N9 in men compared with women: greater 
risk of exposure in men, worse prognosis for infected men than infected women, and 
va rying health-seeking behaviours.20
Interpretation
Our study showed that the higher incidence rate of cases of H7N9 infection in men than in 
women was more apparent in urban than in rural areas, and the increased risk for men was 
also recorded for H5N1 in urban areas (ﬁ gure 3). This ﬁ nding is more consistent with 
exposure playing a major part in the risk of infection, although we cannot rule out the 
possibility of diﬀ erences in immunity or health-care-seeking behaviours. Most cases of both 
viruses reported recent exposure to poultry (table 1) and good evidence suggests low 
human-to-human transmissibility in view of extensive contact tracing eﬀ orts and very few 
potential secondary cases identiﬁ ed. Some of the epidemiological variables were similar for 
both viruses (ﬁ gure 4 A–C), whereas patients infected with H5N1 admitted to hospital had a 
higher risk of death (70% vs 36%) and more rapid disease progression than patients infected 
with H7N9 (ﬁ gure 4D). In view of the seasonal pattern in human infections with inﬂ uenza A 
H5N1 virus in China (ﬁ gure 2B), we must be prepared for H7N9 to reappear later this year.
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China, and only one new laboratory-conﬁ rmed case of 
H7N9 in human beings has been identiﬁ ed since May 8, 
2013. If H7N9 follows a similar pattern to H5N1 
(ﬁ gure 2B), the epidemic could reappear in the autumn. 
This potential lull should be an opportunity for discussion 
of deﬁ nitive preventive public health measures, optimi-
sation of clinical management, and capacity build ing in 
the region in view of the possibility that H7N9 could 
spread beyond China’s borders. 
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